Windows of Opportunity: China's Continuing Conquest of the South China Sea

The continuing dispute between China and Philippines over the aptly-named Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands is but the latest chapter in an ongoing, low-level struggle for control over the South China Sea. This struggle-theoretically between six rival claimant countries, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines-has increasingly developed into a confrontation between China (backed, passively, by Taiwan) and the rest. Yet despite collective ASEAN opposition to Beijing's claims, it is difficult to see how China can be stopped.

The conflict in the South China Sea is about fishing and oil exploration rights, no doubt. But more than this, it is about China's perception of its place in the region; the realisation of that country's long-held plans to establish itself as the regional super power.

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Vietnamese civilians sheltering in a slit trench.

China's slow expansion into the South China Seas merely continues a southward territorial imperative that had reached a natural frontier-the sea. Both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan agree that the Paracel and Spratly Islands [which they call the Hsi Sha, or "Western Sands", and Nan Sha, or "Southern Sands"] have been Chinese from time immemorial. In fact they seem to have belonged to nobody until the present century-though the British charted them as an aid to navigation during the mid-19th century, and the French maintained a watchful eye over the Paracels during their colonial administration of Indochina.

Resurgent China's first move into the disputed area came as early as 1947, when Kuomintang forces loyal to Chiang Kai-shek took advantage of China's first window of opportunity in the South China Sea-France's discomfiture in Indochina-to occupy Woody Island in the Paracels group.

The communist seizure of power in Mainland China in 1949 changed nothing-there are certain basic principles on which CCP and KMT have always agreed, including Chinese control of Tibet and the South China Sea. Chinese sovereignty over these areas is not held in doubt-only the legitimacy of who rules China is in dispute.

With the exception of Woody Island and the more easterly Macclesfield Bank, most of the Paracels were in Vietnamese hands when France withdrew from Indochina in 1954. The Vietnamese-who know the Paracels as the Hoang Sa and the Spratlys as the Truong Sa- also claim both groups in their entirety as an inalienable part of their national territory.

China had to wait a long time for a second window of opportunity to arise in the South China Sea, but when the time came the PLA moved swiftly to take advantage of the situation. The Second Indochina War (1954-75) saw North Vietnam and its Chinese ally pitted against South Vietnam backed by the United States. Almost to the end of this period the Saigon government maintained Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN] forces on the Paracels with the tacit consent of Hanoi (who feared a Chinese take-over of the islands), and under the protection of US air power.

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ARVN soldier in the Spratlys.

In 1973 this balance of power changed. President Thieu lost the USAF umbrella when the United States determined to "Vietnamise" the war and limit direct American involvement in the fighting. This decision led to the rapid collapse of the South and the withdrawal of the last American forces from Vietnam in April, 1975. Before this could happen, however-and before a united, communist government could take control of Vietnam-China struck.

In January, 1974, to the horror and impotent fury of Hanoi, Chinese forces attacked the ARVN troops holding the Paracels and, using surface-to-surface missiles and overwhelming military force, swept them out. Ignoring North Vietnam's claim to the islands, China followed this action up by occupying the whole group, announcing at the same time China's "indisputable sovereignty over both the Paracels and the Spratlys, as well as the seas around them".

Hanoi, diplomatically isolated within the region and fully engaged in a war for which Chinese backing was crucial, could do little. China, meanwhile, went on to press its claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea at the 3rd United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in June, 1974. This was certainly noted by Hanoi, which announced the take-over of six Spratly islets from ARVN forces-"beloved islands in the fatherland's waters"-soon after the fall of Saigon.

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Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Beijing responded by publishing an edition of China Pictorial in October, 1975, which carried an illustrated article on Chinese exploration in the Paracels and reaffirmed its claim to the group. One month later, in the November issue of the Vietnamese army journal, Hanoi pledged 'to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the whole country, including the islands and the continental shelf�. The war of words continued later in the same month, when People's Daily-without specifically naming Vietnam-published China's most extensive and detailed claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea, noting that 'some islands have not yet returned to the hands of the Chinese people'. The article concludes that 'We will absolutely not allow anyone to invade and occupy our territory on any pretext. The Spratlys are China's sacred territory. We have the duty to defend them�.

The territorial claims made by China at this time, and restated many times since, extend well over a thousand kilometres to the south of Hainan Island and reach to within a few kilometres of Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines. They directly contest islets and reefs within the claimed territorial waters of those states, and also encompass territorial waters claimed by Indonesia.

Two years later, in July, 1977, following the death of Mao Tse-tung and the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping, the then Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua, gave notice of China's intention to take possession of all these 'lost territories'. "As to when we will recover the islands", he added with more than a hint of menace, "this will have to wait until the time is ripe".

The struggle between China and Vietnam was now on with a vengeance, leading ultimately to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978, and to China's retaliatory invasion of northern Vietnam early in 1979. Most contemporary analysis at that time concentrated, understandably, on the major events taking place on the mainland, to the exclusion of Sino-Vietnamese disagreements over the South China Sea.

China-and soon Vietnam-knew otherwise, however. During negotiations which took place at Hanoi in April 1979, short weeks after China's stalled "lesson" had ground to a halt, the Chinese negotiators demanded Vietnamese recognition of China's claims in the South China Sea as part of any overall peace agreement. Hanoi demurred, and relations remained bad.

For most of the 1980s Vietnam was fully occupied with the occupation of Cambodia and its continuing, debilitating struggle with the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge. China, meanwhile, continued its territorial drive in the South China Sea, sending their southern fleet to patrol the distant Spratlys, and launching renewed attacks against the Vietnamese border in April, 1984. On this occasion Vietnam had backers, however. Moscow condemned China's 'military provocations', cancelled the planned visit of Soviet first deputy premier Ivan Arkhipov to Beijing, and landed Russian marines near Haiphong for a 'joint exercise'. Beijing professed itself "shocked" by the Soviet reaction - but no new atolls were occupied.

By 1988 the treacherous sands of South Seas diplomacy were shifting once again, opening a third, brief window of opportunity for the policy-makers in Beijing. Vietnam, bled white by the continuing conflict in Cambodia, announced its intention to withdraw completely from that country by 1989. It became imperative for China to act in the Spratlys while Vietnam was still an international pariah, stigmatised by its continuing presence in Cambodia. The Soviet Union, outspent by the United States and weary of the conflict in Afghanistan, was (correctly) deemed unlikely to react in any meaningful way.

Accordingly, in late 1987, China began a series of naval exercises in the South China Sea. In January, 1988, PLA troops were landed on two of the disputed Spratly islands, leading within weeks to a military confrontation in the area with Vietnam. According to Vietnamese reports, six Chinese warships attacked three Vietnamese freighters, sinking one, badly damaging the others, and killing seventy-four men. Hanoi's calls for negotiations were refused by Beijing, which bluntly reiterated its claim that China's sovereignty was 'indisputable'. To underscore this point, one year later, in April 1989, Chinese forces occupied a third atoll, causing a renewed outbreak of hostilities.

During the 1990s everything continued to go China's way. Beijing's naval build up accelerated, in marked contrast to Vietnam's continuing military decline. China now had the beginnings of a real "blue water" navy, as yet posing no serious threat beyond the region, but more than a match for any of China's rivals in the South China Sea, whether taken individually or even collectively.

Meanwhile, in related developments, the once powerful Soviet Far Eastern Fleet withdrew Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, whilst the Philippines, in a move they may soon have come to regret, requested the USA to leave first Clark Air Base, and subsequently the huge Subic Bay naval facility. Following this last development, especially, China's military and political planners must have been quietly delighted!

In logical terms, China now enjoyed a fourth strategic window of opportunity to move against its main rival, Vietnam, in the Spratly Islands. Vietnam was no match for China at sea, and remained relatively isolated, having lost its great Soviet ally. In 1995, however, Vietnam joined ASEAN, a move that gave Hanoi increased status and influence, as well as a group of new allies, most of whom were traditionally suspicious of China's role in the region.

Viewed in the cold light of past Chinese expansion in the South China Sea, the first half of 1995 would have seemed an ideal time to move against Vietnam in the Spratlys. Yet this did not happen. Instead China moved against the Philippines, erecting "structures" on Panganiban Reef (named Meijijiao by the Chinese, and aptly designated "Mischief Reef" on international shipping charts), as well as large stone markers on Jackson Atoll and Half-moon Reef. All three islets lie close to the Philippine island of Palawan, and form part of the Kalayaan chain of islands, atolls and reefs claimed by Manila.

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Mischief Reef

Why did this happen? What caused China to break the pattern of decades and go for broke in the South China Sea? Beijing realises that ASEAN would vocally oppose any further move on the Spratlys, but that nobody (except Vietnam) was likely to fight. ASEAN-with the notable exception of Singapore-has shot itself in the foot not once, but several times, and is in no condition to oppose Beijing.

Following the closure of United States military bases in the Philippines-extremely powerful facilities which could have deterred China and helped to maintain the status quo-both Indonesia and Thailand refused the USA off-shore military storage facilities. Washington has since made it clear that it will not get involved in the Spratlys dispute, whilst at the same time advocating a peaceful solution to the problem.

Unfortunately for ASEAN, and especially for those countries with claims in the Spratlys, by shunning the United States they have created a power vacuum in the area which China is slowly continuing to fill.

Quite simply, Beijing can do more or less as it pleases in the Spratlys. In earnest of this, following China's 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef, General Joe Al-Monte, then Secretary-General of the Philippine National Security Council, admitted that China "out-gunned" the Philippines, and that the Filipino armed forces could offer no serious resistance. This was confirmed by Roberto Romulo, then Filipino Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who announced that his country would not go to war with China over the Spratlys. In a remarkable piece of double-speak, Romulo added: "Aggression is not an option".

In fact it is clear that the aggression has already occurred. What is no longer an easy option is defence. As a consequence it now seems probable that the South China Sea will continue, albeit gradually, to pass under Chinese control in coming years.

This article was originally published in the The Nation (Thailand).

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