Osama bin Laden and the Politics of Islam in Afghanistan

Following the recent horrific attacks in New York and Washington, it has become commonplace for Western analysts to characterize the terrorist actions of Al-Qaeda and its charismatic leader, Osama bin Laden, as unrepresentative of Islam. US President George Bush regularly denounces bin Laden in Biblical terms as "the Evil One", while British premier Tony Blair insists that "our Arab and Muslim brothers and sisters" have nothing in common with, and much to fear from, bin Laden and his evil cohorts.

Islam, we are assured by these optimists, is quintessentially a "Religion of Peace", which bin Laden and al-Qaeda have attempted to hijack. Would that things were so simple--but they are not. Suggestions that bin Laden is in some way "un-Islamic" are both simplistic and uninformed, rooted more in hope than in substance. Quite simply--and dangerously--they are wrong.

Islam is a vast and complex edifice. Like other world religions--indeed, perhaps more than most--it has been riven by sectarian rivalry and religious dissent almost from the time of its inception. As a consequence, the Muslim World has become a very "broad church" indeed, encompassing traditions as diverse and different as the austere puritanism of the Wahhabis and the ecstatic mysticism of the Sufis. The truth is, not only do the religious beliefs of Osama bin Laden belong firmly within the Islamic tradition, but--although not adhered to by the great majority of Muslims--they can be traced directly back to the earliest centuries of the Islamic Era.

Until recently the study of fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, can have interested few people outside Muslim seminaries. Since the events of September 11, however, this arcane science has acquired a new significance. If we are to understand the fire that drives Osama bin Laden and his followers, it is necessary to have at least a general idea of where their beliefs fit into the broader scheme of Islam. It is also most instructive to consider how these beliefs fit--or rather don't fit--into the traditional political framework of Afghanistan.

Following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, the majority of the umma, or community of believers, elected to follow Abu Bakr as khalifa or successor, whilst a substantial minority insisted that the succession should have passed directly to Ali, the prophet's son-in-law. From this developed the first and greatest schism in Islam, between Sunni and Shia. Sunni Muslims (from the Arabic sunna, or "path", meaning the customs of the Prophet and his companions) represent almost 90% of the world Muslim community, while Shia (from the Arabic shiat Ali, or "party of Ali") broadly represent the remainder.

Within the Sunni tradition four madhhab, or "schools of law", all of which are adjudged equally valid, are recognised. These are the Hanafi, named after imam Abu Hanifa (d. 767); the Maliki, named after imam Malik ibn Anas (d.795); the Shafi'i, named after imam ash-Shafi'i (d.819); and the Hanbali, named after imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d.855).

The Hanafi, which predominates in Turkey, Central Asia, China, South Asia and--crucially, at the present time--Afghanistan, is the oldest and the most liberal madhhab, permitting, for example, the recitation of the Qur'an in languages other than Arabic. The Maliki, which predominates in North Africa, and the Shafi'i, which predominates around the Indian Ocean littoral and in Southeast Asia, are not strictly relevant to an analysis of Islam in contemporary Afghanistan. The Hanbali, which is the dominant madhhab of Saudi Arabia and parts of the Arab Gulf, is very relevant indeed, however. The spiritual roots of Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden may be traced directly to this Hanbali tradition.

Briefly, the older and more liberal Hanafi madhhab bases its analysis of Islamic jurisprudence on four legal sources. These main bases are the Qur'an, or Word of God, and the sunna, or customs practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest companions. Where these are not enough, the Hanafi school permits resort to qiyas, or analogical deduction--thus the Qur'an forbids wine because it causes intoxication, which by analogy may be extended to include other intoxicating substances--for example tequila or sake--even though they are not specifically mentioned in the Qur'an. The fourth plank of Hanafi jurisprudence is ijmaa, or consensus. This is based on a statement attributed to the Prophet Muhammad that the umma, or Muslim community, will never be united in an error. In practice, it has come to mean the consensus of the ulama or learned. Finally, Hanafi jurisprudence is more tolerant of adat, or local customary law, than any other Sunni madhhab.

Westerners, especially those descended from reformed Christian or Jewish traditions, might reasonably expect the bases of Islamic law to have embraced broader parameters over the centuries succeeding the foundation of the Hanafi maddhab in the mid-8th century AD. In fact, the opposite is true. The Hanbali madhab, smallest and most recent of the four great schools of Sunni Islam, is also the most conservative and retrogressive, being firmly rooted in the times and traditions of the 7th century, during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Thus Hanbali jurisprudence admits only Qur'an and sunna, while excluding all forms of consensus, opinion or inference. In other words, only Qur'an and sunna are recognized as valid sources of law, today in the 21st century as much as during the lifetime of the Prophet and his companions.

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Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud (left, seated) with other male members of his family, 1911.

Though never popular outside the Arabian Peninsula, Hanbalism has proven remarkably tenacious, and has enjoyed several "revivals", firstly under Ibn Tamiyya in the 14th century, and again under Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century. In 1744 Ibn Abd al-Wahhab formed an alliance with a local Arab chieftain, Muhammad Ibn al-Saud, who embraced the doctrine commonly known as Wahhabism, and went on to lay the foundations of what, in 1932 - under his descendant Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud - would become Saudi Arabia. Today the Saudi polity still remains firmly rooted in the Wahhabi system.

From the time of its foundation in the mid-9th century, Hanbalism (together with subsequent related manifestations, Wahhabi, Deobandi and most recently Salafi) has been characterized by an austere puritanism. Its followers believe that all objects of worship other than Allah are false, and they interpret this very literally. Thus it is absolutely forbidden to introduce the name of a prophet, saint or angel into a prayer. To seek intercession from anyone but Allah constitutes a form of polytheism, and anyone who worships in this way deserves to be put to death.

In earnest of these beliefs, the Wahhabis demolished virtually every tomb at Mecca and Medina, absolutely forbidding prostration or signs of worship at the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad himself. Attendance at public prayers is compulsory for men, and the shaving of the beard and smoking are forbidden. Mosques must be simple and not ornate. It is forbidden to celebrate the Prophet's birthday, to make offerings at tombs of saints, to play music, paint or otherwise portray living things--even to laugh in an excessive or unseemly matter.

Sound familiar? It should. The religious beliefs of Osama bin Laden, most of the Arab and other foreign volunteers in Al-Qaeda and the supposedly crack Taliban 55th Brigade, are rooted in the Wahhabism, and it is this austere tradition that has been foisted on the people of Afghanistan under Taliban.

Viewed from a secular, Western perspective--indeed, viewed from almost any perspective other than that of Al-Qaeda--Osama bin Laden's blending of extreme puritanism with Arab and Islamic nationalism, the logistics of guerrilla warfare and the methodology of terrorism has produced a terrifying and unpredictable witches brew.

The good news is that very few Muslims are prepared to embrace bin Laden's cause absolutely--and in Afghanistan, it would seem, the teachings of Wahhabism are already dead, rejected by the population en masse. How else to explain the outburst of joy all over the country following the ousting of Taliban? Afghans--whether from Sunni or Shia traditions--want to preserve and enjoy their own culture, which involves widespread devotion to local pir or saints, a vibrant Sufi tradition, the playing of music, song and dance. Many, indeed most Afghan men have always worn beards--they just don't want to be told that they have to do so!

David Henley / CPA

Muslim prayer beads.

This does not mean that the Afghans, or the vast majority of Muslims, reject everything that bin Laden and Al-Qaeda stand for, however. It is possible to recognize and resent perceived injustices in the Middle East--such as the continuing occupation of Palestinian territories, the bombing of Iraq, the stationing of Western troops in Saudi Arabia and the devastation of Chechnya--without wishing to ban music or blow up the World Trade Towers.

As the Northern Alliance continues its apparently unstoppable advance, George Bush and Tony Blair should bear this very much in mind. To the advantage of the anti-terrorist alliance, few Muslims anywhere would want to live in the sort of austere, theocratic state envisaged by the Taliban. Few, too, would subscribe to the extreme acts of violence undertaken against defenseless civilians by Al-Qaeda on September 11th, 2001.

And yet many Muslims are deeply unhappy about the continuing political position in the Middle East, where the West--and most notably the US--are perceived as supporting corrupt political dictatorships while opposing the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. Even as the West seeks to dismantle Al-Qaeda militarily and politically, it is important to remember that Osama bin Laden is a Muslim as well as a terrorist. To his mind, and to that of his followers, he is a holy warrior in a classic sense, intent not on self-enrichment, but on the liberation of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem--the three holiest cities of Islam.

To ignore this and to insist that Al-Qaeda is somehow "un-Islamic" is not just unhelpful--it denies both the fundamentally Islamic roots of Osama bin Laden's philosophy and the continuing appeal of his jihad to broad sections of the Muslim community worldwide.

This article was originally published in the Asian Wall Street Journal.

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